Application of data analytics - Case studies by Yu, Jiangmin
APPLICATION OF DATA ANALYTICS — CASE STUDIES
By
Jiangmin Yu
Bachelor of Science in Material Science and Engineering
Wuhan University of Technology
Wuhan, China
2004
Master of Science in Computer Science
Wuhan University of Technology
Wuhan, China
2006
Submitted to the Faculty of the
Graduate College of
Oklahoma State University

















I am grateful to many people for their support throughout the Ph.D. program.
First, I would like to give a special acknowledgment to my chair and mentor, Dr.
Eric Chan-Tin. His patience, expertise and availability have been invaluable for my
study and research. He has provided me opportunities to work on projects, given me
a wealth of knowledge regarding the research, and made my life at Oklahoma State
University an enjoyable experience.
I would also like to thank my committee members, Dr. K. M. George, Dr. Nohpill
Park, and Dr. Weihua Sheng, for their helpful insight and support throughout my
study at Oklahoma State University.
Any level of success I have made is directly attributed to my friends at Oklahoma
State University. Jiyoung Shin, Michael Farcasin and Weiqi Cui provided a great deal
of guidance. I am really fortunate that I joined a team with an outstanding cohort
of individuals. I look forward to continuing our friendships in the future.
I would like to thank my family for their always support. Mom and Dad, thank
you for loving me so much. Finally, I would like to thank my wife, Feibo. Thank you
for your support to my study and research. Thank you for all your time for taking
great care of Beverley. Thank you for being my best friend and by my side every step
of the way.
iii
Acknowledgments reflect the views of the author and are not endorsed by
committee members or Oklahoma State University.
Name: JIANGMIN YU
Date of Degree: MAY, 2017
Title of Study: APPLICATION OF DATA ANALYTICS — CASE STUDIES
Major Field: COMPUTER SCIENCE
Abstract: Data analytics is the technique of finding knowledge by examining raw
data. It is an important tool for researchers to verify existing knowledge or infer new
knowledge. In this dissertation, we focus on anonymous traffic and privacy-aware
systems. Our research is divided into three data analytics case studies. We use data
analytics to learn from and improve existing systems. Tor, an anonymous network,
is designed to protect Internet users from traffic analysis attacks. Researchers have
shown that traffic analysis like timing attack and website fingerprinting attack are still
realistic and can be used to deanonymize Tor users. We first analyze the anonymity
of Tor itself; we show that a timing attack can be used to bypass the anonymity
provided by Tor. We also propose a schema to identify this type of timing attack. Our
second case study is about website fingerprinting. We propose a new realistic cover
traffic algorithm to mitigate website fingerprinting attacks. Our algorithm reduces
the accuracy of website fingerprinting attacks to 14% with zero latency overhead and
20% bandwidth overhead. Our third case study is about webbrowser fingerprinting
in anonymous communications. We analyze the network traffic generated by web
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Data analytics is the technique of finding knowledge by examining raw data. It
is the process of collecting data, analyzing data and drawing information. With
data analytics, researchers can verify existing knowledge and infer new knowledge.
Figure 1.1 shows the process of data analytics. Firstly, raw data is collected from
various sources, such as existing databases, legacy file systems etc.. Raw data then is
processed to remove redundant or unused information. Real raw data usually contains
lots of missing, even erroneous information. We clean the raw data and load it in a
nicely-formatted table such as a database. Finally, we start analyzing the data. There
are two types of analysis: 1) exploratory analysis and model building. Exploratory
analysis is to reveal features of data; usually graphs are drawn to help understand
the data, and 2) knowledge is expressed in terms of models; statistical algorithms or
data mining techniques are used to build these models.
In this dissertation, we use data analytics to learn from and improve existing sys-
tems. Three data analytics case studies are conducted in this dissertation. These
case studies are about privacy-aware systems. The aim is to improve anonymity and
preserve privacy. In the first case study, we analyze the anonymity of Tor itself. We
show that a circuit clogging attack can be used to bypass the anonymity provided
by Tor. We also propose a schema to identify circuit clogging attacks. Our second
case study is about website fingerprinting. We propose a new realistic cover traffic
1
Figure 1.1: Process of data analytics
algorithm to mitigate website fingerprinting attacks. Our algorithm reduces the ac-
curacy of website fingerprinting attacks from 92% to 14% with zero latency overhead
and 20% bandwidth overhead. Our third case study is about webbrowser fingerprint-
ing in anonymous communications. We analyze the network traffic generated by web
browsers and show that features of webbrowsers can be inferred with high probability.
1.1 Case 1: Timing Attack on Tor
Tor is a popular anonymity-providing network used by over 500, 000 users daily. The
Tor network is made up of volunteer relays. To anonymously connect to a server,
a user first creates a circuit, consisting of three relays, and routes traffic through
these proxies before connecting to the server. The client is thus hidden from the
server through three Tor proxies. If the three Tor proxies used by the client could
be identified, the anonymity of the client would be reduced. One particular way of
identifying the three Tor relays in a circuit is to perform a circuit clogging attack.
This attack requires the client to connect to a malicious server (malicious content,
such as an advertising frame, can be hosted on a popular server). The malicious
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server alternates between sending bursts of data and sending little traffic. During the
burst period, the three relays used in the circuit will take longer to relay traffic due to
the increase in processing time for the extra messages. If Tor relays are continuously
monitored through network latency probes, an increase in network latency indicates
that this Tor relay is likely being used in that circuit. We show, through experiments
on the real Tor network, that the Tor relays in a circuit can be identified. A detection
scheme is also proposed for clients to determine whether a circuit clogging attack is
happening. The costs for both the attack and the detection mechanism are small and
feasible in the current Tor network [3].
1.2 Case 2: Website Fingerprinting
Website fingerprinting attacks have been shown to be able to predict the website
visited even if the network connection is encrypted and anonymized. These attacks
have achieved accuracies as high as 92%. Mitigations to these attacks are using
cover/decoy network traffic to add noise, padding to ensure all the network packets
are the same size, and introducing network delays to confuse an adversary. Although
these mitigations have been shown to be effective, reducing the accuracy to 10%,
the overhead is very high. The latency overhead is above 100% and the bandwidth
overhead is at least 40%. We introduce a new realistic cover traffic algorithm, based
on a user’s previous network traffic, to mitigate website fingerprinting attacks. Our
algorithms reduce the accuracy of attacks to 14% with zero latency overhead and
about 20% bandwidth overhead.
3
1.3 Case 3: Webbrowser Fingerprinting
Webbrowser fingerprinting is a powerful tool to identify an Internet end-user. Previ-
ous research has shown that the information extracted from webbrowsers can uniquely
identify an end-user. To collect webbrowser specific information, intentional JavaScript
codes are embedded in web pages. In this research, we show that fingerprinting char-
acteristics of a webbrowser can also be collected by solely checking the network traffic
data generated when browsing a website. We collect network traffic data generated
by browsing the homepage of the most popular websites. Based on this data, we
show that the browser fingerprinting characteristics can be inferred with high accu-
racy. Among these characteristics, type of webbrowser can be identified with over
70% accuracy rate, usage status of popular plug-ins like JavaScript and flash can also
be accurately identified [4].
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CHAPTER 2
Timing Attack on Tor
2.1 Introduction
Anonymity and censorship-resistant systems are becoming more prominent due to the
recent unrest in Egypt and other countries [5–7]. To avoid prosecution and identifica-
tion by oppressive authorities, citizens of these countries require a system that allow
them to maintain their anonymity on the Internet. Various anonymization-providing
services exist nowadays [8–14], with Tor [13, 14] being one of the most popular ones
with over 500, 000 users [15]. Tor is known as a “low-latency” service as interactive
applications such as web-browsing, chat, and remote connections (VPN and ssh for
example) can be used on top of Tor.
A client, who wants to connect to a remote server anonymously, uses Tor as a
proxy. All the connections and messages go through Tor first, then to the server.
Thus, the server believes that the connection is coming from Tor, which hides who
the real client is. The Tor system is made up of a network of relays. Each relay is a
volunteer machine. The client picks three relays from the network to form a circuit:
the entry node, middle node, and exit node. The client establishes a connection with
the entry node, then using the entry node as a proxy, extends that connection to the
middle node, and finally, extends the same connection to the exit node. Then, the
client hops through each of the relays to connect to the server. In this case, the server
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believes the connection is coming from the exit relay. Only the entry relay knows who
the client is, but believes the destination is the middle relay.
The Tor project started around 2004 and has been growing in popularity since.
It is used by citizens of oppressive regimes, dissidents, whistle-blowers, journalists,
and governments’ military for anonymous communication. Currently, there are over
500, 000 users [15] in Tor and over 3, 000 relay nodes [15]. The premise of anonymity
relies on the three relays used by the client to be non-colluding (especially the entry
and exit nodes). Moreover, the identity of the three relays used by a client to connect
to a server is hidden. If an adversary could somehow identify the three relays used by
a client, this breaks some of the anonymity of the client as it reveals which three Tor
relays the client chose. It has been shown in [16] that after the Tor relays in the circuit
have been identified, the identity of the client is also leaked. Thus, deanonymizing
the three relays used by a client is the first step towards identifying which client is
communicating with which server. This has a huge impact on Tor as the anonymity
of any Tor user can be compromised.
There exists many attacks [17–25] in the literature on deanonymizing the client
and the three Tor relays, such as timing attacks, network flow attacks, and circuit
clogging attacks. In this research, we revisit the circuit clogging attack described
in [20] and show that it is still applicable in the current Tor network. The three
relays used in Tor is called a circuit. In a circuit clogging attack, the premise is
that a client creates a circuit and connects to a server using that circuit. The server
or parts of the content of the server (for example an advertising frame) is malicious.
The malicious content alternates between sending a lot of data and sending very little
data. If there were a direct connection between the client and the server, there were
no issue with the extra data. Since each Tor relay can be part of multiple circuits,
when even one circuit is busy delivering a lot of data, that Tor relay will slow down.
In this particular attack, the goal is to identify the three relays used by a client.
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Every relay in the Tor network is continuously monitored, for example, by creating a
1-hop circuit or through system pings. When a relay slows down during the period
of sending burst data (sending a lot of data), its monitoring will show a spike in
network latency. The three Tor relays that show an increase in network latency in
the monitoring are most likely the three relays used in the circuit by the client.
The first described circuit clogging attack [20] on Tor was performed a few years
ago when Tor was still in its infancy. There were only 50 Tor relays at the time, of
which 13 were used to demonstrate the attack. Now, there are over 3, 000 relays and
Tor is heavily used for web traffic and bulk downloads, such as BitTorrent [26] or
peer-to-peer file download traffic. We revisit this attack and show that this circuit
clogging attack to identify the three nodes in a Tor circuit is still applicable today.
Although the authors in [22] claimed that this attack is no longer possible, their
experiments were limited. We performed a full-scale experiment with real Tor nodes.
Our proposed circuit clogging attack and network experiments are slightly different
from the experimental setup in [20] or [22], as shown in Section 2.3. Section 2.5
shows that a distinct pattern can be observed for the Tor relays in the circuit versus
Tor relays not in the circuit. The pattern shows that during the burst period, an
increase in network latency can be observed, while during the “sleep” period, the
network latency decreases to normal. Through experiments performed on the real
Tor network, all the Tor relays used in a circuit under a circuit clogging attack can
be identified over 78% of the time. The bandwidth required to perform the circuit
clogging attack is less than 30KB/second, and the bandwidth needed to monitor all
the 3, 000 Tor relays is 391KB/second.
A detection scheme for clients is also proposed. The detection mechanism probes
all the user’s created circuits for timing information. If it detects a high and un-
expected increase in network latency, the user can disconnect from the server and
destroy the affected circuit. Experiments indicate that the proposed scheme can de-
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tect over 85% of attacks. The scheme also incurs a very low overhead, requiring less
than 3KB/second extra bandwidth to operate. The scheme proposed detects when
a possible circuit-clogging attack is occurring; it does not prevent circuit-clogging
attacks.
The rest of the research is organized as follows. Section 2.2 gives a more detailed
description of how Tor works. An outline of related work is also provided in Sec-
tion 2.2. In Section 2.3, we describe the specific circuit clogging attack from [20] and
how our experiment is set up. A possible solution to identify when a clogging attack
is taking place, is given in Section 2.4. The results of our experiment are shown in
Section 2.5. Finally, in Section 2.6, we discuss future work and conclude.
2.2 Background
We provide a more detailed description of how Tor works, as well as, a threat model
for the attack. The different attacks on Tor to identify the client or the circuit are
then outlined.
2.2.1 Tor
Tor [13, 14], released around 2004, is the second generation onion router [27]. The
Tor network consists of three main entities: directory servers, relays, and clients.
The directory servers are trusted and they keep track of all the relays in the network.
Every relay contacts the directory servers to register itself as a relay and upload its
key and configuration, such as open ports, and advertised bandwidth. The directory
servers regularly form a consensus of all the relays, and sign the consensus document.
The servers also monitor the relays’ advertised bandwidths. Each client contacts the
directory servers to download the consensus document to obtain a list of all the relays
8
(a) (b)
Figure 2.1: (a) Circuit creation in Tor: the client randomly selects three Tor relays in
the Tor network to be its entry, middle, and exit nodes. The same circuit can be used for
different connections (called streams) to different servers. (b) Onion routing and encryption:
A client connects to the server through Tor. The client wants to send a message (blue) to
the server. The client first adds a layer to the message, encrypted with the exit node’s key
(green). Then the client adds a second layer, encrypted with the middle node’s key (black),
and finally, that whole message is encrypted with the entry node’s key (red). At each step,
each relay peels off its layer and forwards the message to the next relay.
and their status. A client can also serve as a relay. The directory servers are currently
hard-coded in Tor, whereas the relays are volunteer machines.
Tor works as follows. A client contacts the directory servers and downloads the
consensus document of all the active relays. The client then needs to construct a
circuit to connect to servers on the Internet. To contact a server, the client proxies
the connection through a circuit. To build a circuit, the client randomly selects
three Tor relays: an entry node, a middle node, and an exit node. The client first
establishes an encrypted connection with the entry node. The client then extends
that circuit, by going through the entry node, to establish an encrypted connection
with the middle node. The client further extends the circuit by establishing another
encrypted connection with the exit relay. Encryption and authentication of each
relay are possible since every relay’s key is part of the consensus document. Once
the circuit is built, the client uses it to proxy connections over, to contact Internet
servers. Circuits are built using onion routing, such that the connection from the
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client to each of the three relays is onion-encrypted. None of the relays see what the
client is sending to the other relays. For example, the entry node cannot tell that
the client is extending the circuit to a particular exit node, as the message to the
middle node is encrypted with the middle node only. Figure 2.1 shows graphically
how circuits and onion encryption work.
Anonymity is achieved since no entity in the network knows who the client and
server are. The entry node only knows that the client is communicating with the
middle node. The middle node knows that a machine (entry node) is communicating
with another machine (exit node). The middle node cannot tell that it is the middle
node of a circuit. Similarly, the exit relay knows that a machine (middle node)
is communicating with a server. Finally, the server believes that the connection is
coming from the exit relay. To prevent an adversary from potentially controlling a
large fraction of entry nodes in all circuits, a client randomly selects three Tor relays
as its entry guard nodes. This means that the client will only pick one of these three
entry guards as its first entry node in any circuit the client creates. The middle and
exit nodes in the circuit are still randomly selected from the consensus document. It
is noted that there are over 3, 000 relays in the Tor network, with about 800 of these
relays marked as exit relays.
Due to the heavy cost, in terms of encryption and processing, in creating circuits, a
client can use one circuit for multiple connections (or streams) to different servers. By
default, each circuit is used for at least 10 minutes before it is recycled and a new one
created. If a connection is still active in a circuit, that circuit is not destroyed but no
new connections are created through that circuit. Circuits can be created in parallel
to increase efficiency. Rate limiting is applied end-to-end using TCP. However, Tor
also implements its own rate limiting. Every connection is associated with a token
bucket. Once a connection runs out of tokens, no new packets can be accepted or
delivered until previous packets have been received.
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In Tor, every packet is a cell, and each cell’s size is 512 bytes. By default, for each
relay, the size of a circuit is 1, 000 cells while the size of a stream is 500 cells. Within
each circuit, cells are scheduled in a First-In-First-Out (FIFO) fashion. There are
currently two scheduling algorithms that can be used within each relay to decide which
circuit’s cells get processed next. The original algorithm uses round-robin to select the
next cell to process. The round-robin is performed among all the circuits. The newer
algorithm uses an exponential weighted moving average (EWMA) to determine which
circuit to process the next cell from. Each cell is weighted exponentially based on
the number of cells in each circuit. Circuits with fewer cells thus have higher priority.
This scheduling algorithm is the recommended one from the consensus document.
2.2.2 Threat Model
The threat model in this research is the same as that used in the original Tor paper [14]
and in the current literature on Tor. The adversary is only local to each entity or
ISP in Tor, and is assumed to not have global capabilities. The adversary can be
either passive or active. Attackers can drop packets, relay packets, modify packets
(note that cells in Tor are encrypted), delay packets, and passively eavesdrop on all
packets. An adversary can listen on the communications at multiple relays, clients,
and/or servers, but not all of them. Moreover, the Tor relays, clients, and servers can
be malicious but the directory servers are honest and trusted.
2.2.3 Related Work
The current literature contains many publications describing attacks on Tor and other
anonymity-providing services [16, 18–23, 28]. Most of these attacks use some sort of
timing analysis to determine which relays, clients, servers, or paths are used. The
simplest attack in Tor, is for the adversary to be in control of both the entry and exit
11
nodes in a circuit. Using timing information, the adversary can correlate that the
two nodes are actually part of the same circuit, and from there, can deduce that a
particular client is communicating with a particular server. If the adversary controls
f relays out of n relays, then the probability that the entry and exit nodes selected
belong to the adversary is ( f
n
)2. This probability is even lower with the introduction
of entry guards.
In 2005, Murdoch and Danezis [20] showed a low-cost traffic analysis attack on
Tor, which allowed them to identify the three relays used in a circuit. The attack
is a variant of the circuit clogging attack, where the adversary attempts to overload
the three relays used, which in turn, increases the network latency timing of these
three relays. Since all other relays are unaffected, an increase in timing of network
latency of three nodes, leads the attacker to conclude that these three nodes are the
three relays in the circuit. This attack assumes that the server or part of the content
being served is controlled by the adversary. From contacting the directory servers,
the adversary also knows all the Tor relays in the network. It can then monitor all the
Tor relays for timing information. The adversary runs a probe client and server. It
then constructs a one-hop (one-node) circuit to each Tor relay. The probe client uses
that circuit to connect to the probe server. The probe keeps each circuit alive and
periodically performs a measurement of the network latency of each circuit. Once the
malicious server receives a connection from Tor, it starts the circuit clogging attack.
The attack consists of a period of low traffic, followed by a period of high traffic,
followed by a period of low traffic, and so on. During the period of high traffic, the
three relays in the circuit become overloaded as they have to process more cells. This,
in turn, leads to an increase in network latency measured by the probe. As all other
relays are unaffected, the three relays, experiencing an increase in network latency,
are likely the three nodes in the circuit. Once the circuit is identified, the attack
can be further extended [16] to narrow down the list of possible clients which created
12
that circuit. The authors of [16] measured the network latency of the whole circuit to
calculate the network latency between the entry node and the server. From there, it
was trivial to calculate the network latency between the victim and the entry node.
The list of possible victims can then be narrowed down using that extra information
(network latency) obtained.
However, the investigation of this low-cost circuit clogging attack was originally
performed in 2005, when Tor consisted of only 50 relays and few users. The primary
use of Tor then, was for remote connections, web traffic, and anonymous chats. Ex-
periments were performed using 13 out of the 50 relays. Nowadays, Tor consists of
thousands of relays, with hundreds of thousands of users. Usage of Tor is also more
diverse, consisting of short and small web traffic and longer and more bandwidth-
intensive file downloads, such as BitTorrent [26]. It is widely believed that this attack
is no longer possible due to the changes in the Tor network mentioned above, such
as increased traffic and more diverse traffic. As far as we know, there was no specific
countermeasure implemented, other than a better scheduling algorithm for circuits.
Evans et al. [22] presented a variant of the clogging attack using long paths. In that
paper, they replicated the Murdoch and Danezis attack and showed that it was no
longer applicable in the Tor network of 2008, due to the noise in the Tor network and
the loss of the effects of the attack in the noise.
We show that a variant of the circuit clogging attack from the 2005 paper [20] is
still possible today. This allows an adversary to identify the three relays used in a
circuit, and can be a stepping stone to actually identify clients of the Tor network. We
note that in our proposed attack, only two out of the three relays are public Tor relays;
the third one is under the adversary’s control. Our attack is more comprehensive than
previous attacks [20,22] as the experiments include all the Tor relays, and the periods
of on/off attack are longer. The attack is also performed on the real Tor network.
The experiment setup is also slightly different, as shown in the next section.
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2.3 Attack Design
We now describe our circuit clogging attack. It is very similar to the clogging attack
from Murdoch and Danezis [20]. The four entities are the client (victim), burst server,
probe, and Tor. The client refers to any user connecting to servers anonymously, using
the Tor network. Tor represents the three relays used in the circuit created by the
client. The three Tor relays are randomly selected from the real Tor network. The
burst server is a malicious server the client connects to, either directly or indirectly.
For example, the burst server can serve advertisement content when the client visits
a major popular website. The goal of the burst server is to introduce enough traffic in
the connection with the client to identify the three Tor relays used in the circuit. The
probe entity is controlled by the same adversary that controls the burst server; the
objective of the probe is to perform network measurements of all the Tor relays. The
probe measures the time to route a message through each Tor relay in the network.
For consistency, the measurement is performed by creating a one-hop circuit through
each Tor relay and measuring the network latency. The probe entity consists of three
components, all hosted on the same physical machine: a probe client, probe server,
and a public Tor exit node. Although the Tor exit node is a public exit relay, its exit
policies are restrictive to only allow exit traffic to the probe server. Moreover, this exit
node advertises low bandwidth and is regularly turned off to prevent it from gaining
the “fast” and “stable” flags in the consensus document, which in turn, decreases the
probability that it will be used by other circuits. Since actual one-hop circuits are not
allowed in Tor, this exit node is needed to simulate a one-hop circuit. Since the exit
node is hosted on the same physical machine as the probe client and server, and is
not used by other circuits, the overhead introduced is small and consistent among all
the network probe measurements. The burst server machine and the probe machine
are time synchronized so that the increase in network latency measurements can be
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Figure 2.2: The layout of our proposed attack experiment. The burst server could be a
physical server or part of the content served by another server, for example an advertisement
server. The circuit created by the client consists of real Tor relays. The probe’s three
components are hosted on the same physical machine. The probe exit node is set up such
that it only accepts exit connections to the probe server.
correlated with the time of the burst traffic period. All the entities of our experiments
are shown in Figure 2.2.
The burst server introduces burst of traffic to the circuit, in an attempt to disrupt
the timing information measured by the probe. The burst server alternates between
a period of burst traffic and a period of low traffic. Ideally, the Tor network traffic is
constant enough that introducing noise or extra messages temporarily will increase
the network latency of the three Tor relays measured by the probe. If this experiment
is performed multiple times, the identity of the three Tor relays used in the circuit can
be identified, and the identity of the client can be leaked [16]. The burst server starts
by sending very few packets for a period TI , to obtain probe measurements during the
initial period. The burst server then sends a burst of packets for a period of TA, then
sends very few packets for a period of time TS, and so on. During the burst period, it
is expected that the probe will measure an increase in network latency for the three
Tor relays used in the circuit, but no increase in network latency in all other relays.
We next describe in more detail how the probe works.
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Figure 2.3: The probe works by creating “one-hop” circuit to each Tor relay, with the exit
node being the probe exit node. In this example, the Tor network is shown to have only
two relays.
The probe client creates a circuit with each of the relays of the Tor network
as the entry node, and chooses the probe exit relay as the exit node. There is no
middle node. Since the exit node is controlled by the probe, essentially, a “one-
hop” circuit is created. Figure 2.3 illustrates how the probe works. Once a circuit is
created, at regular intervals, the probe client sends a timestamp t1 to the probe server
through the circuit. The server records the time t2 that it received the timestamp.
Since the probe client and probe server are located on the same physical machine,
no time synchronization is required. Also, since the probe exit node is not used for
other circuits, the latency through the exit node and the extra time for processing is
minimal. That small extra time is also consistent for all the probe measurements and
does not affect any of the timing information. The network latency of each circuit
(each relay node p) is tp = t2 − t1.
The adversary needs to control the probe’s Tor exit node. It is possible for the
probe’s Tor exit node not to appear in the public consensus document; an adversary
could be more stealthy that way. This requires setting up private directory servers,
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which mirror the real Tor directory servers. This does not affect the results of the
experiments, just whether the probe’s exit relay is public or not. Our modification to
the original circuit clogging attack [20] also requires that the Tor exit node used in
the circuit, shown in Figure 2.2, be controlled by the adversary. We plan to relax that
requirement in future work. Although the Tor exit node advertises a low bandwidth
to the directory servers (10 KB/s), it is allowed to relay as much traffic as the network
bandwidth allows; this is to prevent our two Tor exit nodes (probe and client circuit)
to be used in other circuits.
2.4 Proposed Detection Scheme
We propose a scheme that can be used by all clients using Tor to detect when a
circuit clogging attack is happening. Recall that a circuit clogging attack, like the
one described in the previous section, can reduce the anonymity of all Tor users.
When a possible circuit clogging attack is detected, the client can disconnect from
the server and destroy the affected circuit. This detection scheme can also be used
by the Tor operators, such as the directory servers, to monitor the Tor network for
circuit clogging attacks.
The idea behind the proposed scheme is to use a probe to measure the network
latency of each circuit. This is similar to the adversary using a probe to build one-hop
circuits to each Tor relay. When the client creates a circuit, it also starts a client
probe through the same circuit. The client probe regularly sends a timestamp ts1
through the circuit to the victim probe server. The probe server replies with the
same message ts1. Once the client probe receives the reply from the probe server, it
calculates the current time ts2, and the RTT or network latency for that circuit is
ts = ts2 − ts1. Both the victim client and the victim probe are hosted on the same
physical machine. Both the burst server and the victim probe server are also hosted
17
Figure 2.4: The layout of the proposed detection scheme for circuit clogging attacks. The
two new entities are the victim probe and the victim probe server. The probe works similar
to the attack probe, except the whole circuit is monitored instead of individual relays.
on the same server. Figure 2.4 depicts the setup for the proposed detection scheme.
In our experiments, we set up both a victim probe and a victim probe server. In a
real attack, the victim probe server is not needed. The network latency of the whole
circuit can be obtained through the lower layers. For example, the TCP sequence
numbers and corresponding timestamps can be examined to determine the network
latency for each circuit. Also, a public trusted server, similar to the Tor directory
servers, can be hosted to reply to victim probes. As the next section shows, the costs
required to run such a server are not very big. The challenges in setting up a public
probe server is outside the scope of this research. All the clients need to run is an
extra process or thread for the victim probe, which sends a probe at regular intervals
through all the created circuits.
It can be argued that clients can also set-up one-hop circuit for each of the relays
used. However, since Tor, by default, blocks one-hop exits, the client will have to also




All our experiments were performed during February 2013 using Tor version 0.2.3.25.
The client, burst server, and probe were hosted on different machines, and were time
synchronized. In a real attack, only the burst server and the probe are controlled by
an adversary. Before each experiment, the latest consensus document was downloaded
from the Tor directory servers. Only the Tor relays with the “fast” and “stable” flags
were chosen. The Tor node selection uses these criteria as well, so our experiment is
close to what would happen in a real attack. Two Tor relays were randomly chosen
to be the entry and middle relay in the circuit used by the client to connect to the
burst server. The exit relay is hosted on our server; we plan to relax this constraint
later. Two other Tor relays were also chosen, as a control case. In our experiments,
we are only probing four Tor relays, not the whole Tor network – an actual attack
would have to probe the whole Tor network. The entry and middle relays are referred
as TorC , while the two other Tor relays are referred as TorR. The probe creates a
“one”-hop circuit to each of the four relays and sends a network measurement every
5 seconds. The initial time period TI was set to 15 minutes, while the burst attack
period TA was set to 5 minutes, and the sleep period TS was set to 5 minutes. Each
experiment was run for 60 minutes. Instead of creating one single connection, the
client is multi-threaded and sets up 5 threads to connect to the server. All the 5
threads use the same circuit. In a real setting, a server can redirect a client to 5
different content servers; many web browsers download multiple parts of a server in
parallel. For each experiment, the four Tor relays are randomly selected from the list
of Tor nodes.
Figure 2.5 shows a probe’s network measurement of a Tor relay used in the circuit.



























Figure 2.5: Probe network measurement for a Tor relay used in the client circuit. The
burst attack period starts at the red (solid) vertical line and stops at the green (dashed)
vertical line. The pattern of burst/sleep periods can be clearly seen.
the burst period (the beginning of which is indicated by the red darker solid vertical
line), the latency measured increases, and during the sleep period (the beginning of
which is indicated by the green lighter dashed vertical line), the latency decreases to
that of the initial period. The initial period is used to set the baseline for the average
network latency for each relay.
The victim probe also is set to measure the latency of the circuit every 5 seconds.
2.5.2 Results of Attack
Figure 2.6 shows an example of an experiment run. The figure shows the probe’s
network latency measurement for the four Tor relays used in that experiment: two
of them were part of the circuit, and the other two were not part of the circuit.
Figure 2.6(a) and (b) refer to the entry and middle node in the circuit, respectively,
while Figure 2.6(c) and (d) refer to the other two Tor relays. These two Tor relays
((c) and (d)) act as a control case, representing all the relays in the Tor network.
The probings of these two relays should show no difference during the burst attack







































































































(c) Other relay (d) Other relay
Figure 2.6: The probe’s network latency measurement over time for (a) the entry relay,
(b) the middle relay, (c) and (d) the other two Tor relays not part of the circuit.
a distinct pattern, which is seen in Figure 2.6.
The probe machine is time-synchronized with the burst server and knows when
the different periods (initial/burst/sleep) happen. The initial time period TI is used
as a baseline. The baseline time tb is calculated as the average of all the network
latency times during the initial period TI . The average time for each period is also
calculated. For the entry and middle relays’ measurements, it is expected that the
average time during the burst periods will be higher than tb, and the average time
during the sleep periods will be about the same as tb. For the two other Tor relays
TorR, it is expected that the average time for all the periods will be similar to the
average initial time tb. Due to noise and variations in probe measurements, such
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as a Tor relay being used in a bandwidth-intensive circuit, the average time for the
sleep periods for TorC and for all periods for TorR might be higher than the average
initial time tb. If this happens, this is called a false positive. These regular variations
in the network latencies measured lead to using a threshold value α to determine
whether the average time ta for a period indicates a burst period or a sleep period. If
ta ≥ α×tb, then this indicates that the network latency measured is high enough that
it indicates a burst period. Relays experiencing such high network latencies during
actual burst periods are marked as possible entry or middle relays used in the circuit.
The value of the threshold α is varied from 1.0 − 5.0.
The varying threshold produces different numbers of false positives (a random
Tor relay accidentally marked as being part of the circuit used to connect to the
burst server) and different numbers of correct predictions or numbers of true positives
(correct Tor relay identified as being either entry or middle relay in the circuit used
to connect to the burst server). The Receiver Operator Characteristic (ROC) [29]
curve shows the trade-off between the false positive rate and the true positive rate.
Figure 2.7 illustrates the ROC curve for our experiments, when varying the threshold
α. The line y = x (green line in the figure) shows the true positive rate and the false
positive rate when randomly determining whether a Tor relay is part of the circuit or
not (50% probability of being correct). The vertical line from (0, 0) to (1, 1) shows
a perfect classifier where all the Tor relays part of the circuit are correctly identified
and there are no false positives. Figure 2.7 shows that our experiments fall between
the perfect classifier and random classifier. This means that our attack is better than
random but not perfect. The area under the curve (AUC) shows the trade-off between
the true and false positive rate. The perfect classifier has an area under the curve
of 1.0 and the completely random classifier has an AUC of 0.5. The area under the
curve for our attack is 0.78. The area under the curve when using one thread for






















Figure 2.7: The Receiver Operator Characteristic (ROC) curve for the probe measure-
ments. The area under the curve (AUC) is 0.78 and the equal error rate is 28%. The y = x
line indicates the random classifier.
using more threads is more effective at performing the circuit clogging attacks than
using just one thread. The equal error rate indicates when the false positive rate is
equal to the true positive rate. The lower the equal error rate, the more accurate is
the system. Our attack achieved an equal error rate of 28%, which means that our
attack is accurate.
The results indicate that the circuit clogging attack is still possible in the current
Tor network. The probings of Tor relays for measuring the network latency is effective
at determining when a burst attack period occurs and at identifying whether a relay
is used in the circuit by the client to connect to the malicious burst server. We
note that our attack is conservative: more server threads, a higher burst of messages,
and a longer running time with more burst/sleep periods will make the attack more
accurate. However, since our experiments were performed on the real Tor network,
we did not want to affect the load on the Tor relays unnecessarily.
2.5.3 Detection Scheme
The proposed detection scheme was run at the same time as the attack. Each probe





























Figure 2.8: One experiment showing the client’s probe of a circuit used for connecting to
the burst server. The periods of burst/sleep can be clearly seen in the figure.
not know when the burst periods are, which is different for the attacker’s probe.
For experimental simplicity, the victim machine and the burst server are also time-
synchronized. This allows us to determine the baseline and calculate the number
of correct predictions of circuit clogging attack happening. Figure 2.8 shows a time
versus network latency measured graph for the victim probe in a circuit that is used
to communicate with the busrt server. It can be clearly seen in the figure that during
the burst period, the network latency measured increases and gradually goes back
to normal when the burst period ends. The increase in network latency is also more
pronounced than for the attack probes, as seen in Figure 2.6; the y-axis scales are
different. For the one-hop attacker probe circuits, only one relay is affected, whereas
for the client’s three-hop circuits, three relays are affected.
Similar to the attack probe measurement, an initial time period TI is needed to
set the baseline average time tc. The baseline time can be obtained by the client
probe connecting to the client probe server some time before connecting to the burst
server, or through the average of all other circuit times, or through a network-wide
latency average in the consensus document. When the measured circuit network
latency exceeds the baseline initial time tc, this circuit is marked as suspicious. If the
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burst period was active at that time, then this counts as a correct prediction. Our
proposed detection scheme is able to accurately detect 87.5% of all burst periods;
that is, it can predict when a circuit clogging attack is happening 87.5% of the time.
The proposed detection scheme is thus accurate. Although the scheme is not
perfect, once a possible attack is detected, all the connections streamed over that
circuit can be reported to the user, with a list of all the servers. After the detection
scheme is run for some time, the repeated servers on the reported list are suspicious
and can be further investigated. This whole detection and reporting mechanism
can be performed transparently to the user. The challenges in authenticating this
list and preventing “bad-mouthing” of honest servers are outside the scope of this
research. The proposed detection scheme allows the client to destroy a suspicious
circuit, to preserve the user’s anonymity. The proposed detection mechanism has
some limitations, such as false positives and the overhead/cost in creating a new
circuit. The user has control when to destroy a suspicious circuit. The user can
disconnect as soon as the circuit is flagged as suspicious, or it can wait until k “bursts”
are detected.
2.5.4 Costs
The total costs and overhead for performing the burst attack (hosting the malicious
content) and the probe machine are small, as will be shown in this section.
The bandwidth used in our burst server during the burst attack period is less than
30 KB/second, on average. If the malicious content is hosted on Amazon EC2 [30],
the cost to run one server for one circuit is $11.38 per month. The storage and
processing needed to maintain the burst server are minimal, and the costs for storage
and processing are assumed to be minimal.
The bandwidth required to probe one Tor relay is 130.4 bytes/second. Probings
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are performed every 5 seconds. If a more fine-grained measurement is required, the
interval between measurement can be decreased, which will increase the costs to run
the probe machine. With 3, 000 relays, this is 3000 ∗ 130.40 = 391, 200 bytes/second,
which is a bandwidth of about 391 KB/second. The cost to run the probe on Ama-
zon EC2 is $121.91 per month. The processing needed for each network latency
measurement is minimal. The storage required is to record all the network latency
measurements, which consist of timestamps. Each timestamp is only 13 bytes. For a
60 minute experiment, this is 9.36KB for probing one relay, or 28MB storage for all
the relays.
The bandwidth required for a client to run the proposed detection mechanism
is 130.4 bytes/second, for each circuit the client creates. With possibly 20 circuits
created, this is an extra bandwidth of 2, 608 bytes/second or 2.6 KB/second which is
minimal. The interval for each probe is 5 seconds; this interval can be decreased for
an increase in extra bandwidth needed but faster detection. If the victim probe server
is a public server, the bandwidth required to reply to 5-minutes probe from 500, 000
clients using 20 circuits is 21.7MB/second or 1.9TB/day, which is $5, 870 on Amazon
EC2. In general, the overall costs of running a victim probe, including processing,
storage, and network, are minimal. The benefit of running a probe, however, is real,
and allows a client to detect the occurrence of a circuit clogging attack. This helps
to preserve the client’s anonymity.
2.6 Discussion and Conclusion
We showed that a circuit clogging attack is still possible in the current Tor network,
contrary to previous claims. The goal of a circuit clogging attack is to identify all the
Tor relays used in a circuit. A client uses the circuit to connect to a malicious server
(or malicious content hosted on a honest server). The malicious server periodically
26
switches between burst mode and sleep mode. During burst modes, the server sends
a burst of messages, while during the sleep modes, the server sends a few messages
only. Since all the relays in the Tor network are monitored through probe network
latency measurements, a spike in network latency is observed for the three Tor relays
used in the circuit during the burst periods. The costs to perform a circuit clogging
attack are also very low, making it a practical attack. We showed that the Tor relays
used in a circuit can be accurately identified. Moreover, the false positive rate is low
as only some other Tor relays not used in the circuit are accidentally identified as
being part of the circuit.
A circuit clogging attack detection mechanism is also proposed. The scheme uses a
probe to monitor all the circuits created by the client, instead of each Tor relay. Once
an increase in network latency from a previously recorded baseline time is measured,
the server is flagged as suspicious. The client can then disconnect from the server
and destroy the affected circuit. Through experiments on the real Tor network, the
proposed detection scheme has an accuracy of over 85%.
This research showed that the anonymity of a person using Tor is reduced since
the Tor relays used can be identified. This can be a stepping stone towards narrowing
down the possible users behind these relays. The detection scheme proposed allows
a user to detect possible occurrences of circuit clogging attacks. With over 500, 000
users daily, the attack has huge potential consequences. The proposed detection
scheme can help hundreds of thousands of people stay anonymous on the Internet.
Although a detection mechanism is better than nothing, a prevention algorithm
would be best. We leave as future work designing a scheduling algorithm that can
prevent circuit clogging attacks, such as [28]. The current experimental set-up re-
quires that the Tor exit node in the circuit be under the control of the attacker. We
performed 15 experiments where all the nodes in the circuit are public Tor relays and






















Figure 2.9: The Receiver Operator Characteristic (ROC) curve for the probe measure-
ments, where all the relays in the client circuit are public Tor relays. The area under the
curve (AUC) is 0.72. The y = x line indicates the random classifier.
(AUC) was 0.72, which is close to an AUC of 0.78 when the exit relay belonged to
the adversary. Based on this promising preliminary result, we plan on extending our
attack such that the exit node used in the circuit is a regular Tor exit node. We
will explore ways to improve the accuracy of the attack, such as using multiple server
threads, varying the time of the burst/sleep periods, and modifying the amount of
data sent during the burst periods.
The current attack identifies the Tor relays in the circuit; future work will identify
which of the relays are the entry, middle, and exit relays. This would require more
fine-grained probe measurements. One of the anonymity improvements in Tor is to
use entry guards, a fixed set of three relays used as entry relay in any circuit. We
will also analyze whether using entry guards leaks any information, as the user could
be more easily identified. If the same entry relay is found in circuits, this can leak
information about the user. The possible impact of the attack on bridges and hidden





Website fingerprinting violates the privacy expected from a user when she is using an
anonymizing service such as a proxy or Tor [13]. The goal of website fingerprinting
attacks [31] is to determine the website visited by a victim. The adversary, in this case,
is usually local, for example on the same network or the Internet Service Provider,
and can observe all the network traffic sent by the victim. These attacks are effective
and are very accurate in successfully identifying the websites. The accuracy is over
90% even when the network traffic is encrypted or anonymized through a proxy. Since
the adversary knows who the user is and can accurately guess what websites she is
visiting, the user has no privacy.
Various defenses against website fingerprinting attacks [32–36] have been pro-
posed. The defenses include padding so that every packet has the same size, cover
traffic to generate enough noise to fool the adversary, or introducing network delays
between network packets. Although they have been shown to be effective, the over-
head introduced by these defenses is very high. The latency overhead is above 100%
and the bandwidth overhead is from 50% to over 100%.
Our contribution is a new cover traffic algorithm that generates just enough
noise to mitigate website fingerprinting attacks. Our algorithm also has zero latency
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Mitigation Accuracy (%) Latency Overhead (%) Bandwidth Overhead(%)
No Defense 91% 0% 0%
CS-BuFLO [36] 22% 173% 130%
Tamaraw [33] 10% 200% 38%
WTF-PAD [1] 15% 0% 54%
Our Algorithm 14% 0% 20%
Table 3.1: Comparison of our algorithm’s accuracy and overhead with previous mit-
igation schemes. We showed the lowest accuracy numbers for the other schemes,
regardless of algorithms used. The table is based from [1].
overhead and lower bandwidth overhead than current schemes. Our algorithm gen-
erates “realistic” cover traffic; it collects the network traffic from a user, then uses
that historical network traffic data as training set to feed the cover traffic generation
algorithm. The generated noise thus will look exactly like a website that a user has
previously visited. This prevents website fingerprinting attacks and introduces little
bandwidth overhead.
Table 3.1 shows a comparison of our proposed algorithm with existing mitigation
techniques. Our algorithm has comparable accuracy with the other schemes, zero
latency overhead, and lower bandwidth overhead. The table shows the lowest accu-
racy (best-case for the mitigation) regardless of the classification algorithm used. Our
algorithm has zero latency overhead since we are only introducing cover traffic. No
padding or delays are introduced.
Section 3.2 describes website fingerprinting attacks and our threat model. The
design of our proposed cover traffic algorithm is provided in Section 3.3. The setup
for our experiments is outlined in Section 3.4 and Section 3.5 shows the effectiveness
of our proposed algorithm. A survey of related work is given in Section 3.6 while




Website fingerprinting aims to determine the website visited by examining the network
trace sent by a victim’s webbrowser. That trace is usually encrypted and sent over
a proxy or an anonymous network like Tor [13, 14] so that the network contents
cannot be analyzed. The only information that can be observed are the packet sizes,
the direction of the packets, the time interval between packets, and the number of
packets sent and received.
A packet trace PT consists of n network packets. PT also consists of the tuple
< Σni=0Ni, Ns, Nc >, where Ni is each individual network packet, Ns is the total
number of packets from server to client, Nc is the total number of packets sent from
the client to the server. Each network packet Ni forms the tuple < Si, Ti, D,Ms,Mc >,
where Si is the size of the packet, Ti is the time interval until the next packet, D is
the direction of the network packet (from client to server or from server to client),
Ms is the number of packets from the server to the client, and Mc is the number of
packets from the client to the server. Ms and Mc denotes each “train” of packets,
that is, there are usually a few packets from client to the server, followed by several
packets from server to client. On the other hand, Nc and Ns denotes the total number
of packets for the whole packet trace.
3.2.2 Classification
Previous work [2,31–33,37–47] have achieved a classification accuracy of around 90%
in both the open and closed world settings. A closed world is where the set of training
packet traces are the same as the testing set. An open world setting is where there
is a small set of monitored/sensitive packet traces among a larger set; the goal is to
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detect if a packet trace belongs to one of these monitored websites.
To perform classification, various features have been used such as number of out-
going and incoming packets, total size of incoming and outgoing packets, and cumu-
lative size of packets. If the Tor network is used, some features that have also been
considered include the Tor cells before and after. Various algorithms have also been
used such as k-nearest neighbors (K-NN), support vector machine (SVM), random
decision forests, edit distances, Jacard index, and Naive Bayes.
In this work, we used the same features as those mentioned in [2]: cumulative
size of packets sampled at regular intervals over the whole packet trace, number of
incoming packets, total size of incoming packets, number of outgoing packets, and
total size of outgoing packets. We also used the random decision forests as this was
used by the most recent paper [47].
3.2.3 Mitigations
Various defenses against website fingerprinting attacks have been proposed such as
padding of packets to a fixed size and cover traffic (noise) to mask the real packet
trace. They have all been shown to be somewhat effective reducing the accuracy of
website fingerprinting to about 10% to 30%. However, all of these defenses incur high
latency overhead or high bandwidth overhead or both.
Our proposed algorithm achieves a similar reduction in accuracy while keeping
the overhead manageable. Our cover traffic generated is realistic instead of random
as it depends on what the user has done previously. A threshold value for the amount




The threat model is a local adversary that can see all the network traffic from a user.
The adversary cannot decrypt the contents of the network packets but can observe
the metadata such as packet sizes, direction of the packets, and the timings of packets.
The adversary can also look at the IP headers to determine the source and destination
IP addresses and port numbers. The goal for the adversary is to guess the website or
webpage from only the encrypted network packet trace.
3.3 Proposed Noise Algorithm
Our proposed algorithm to generate cover traffic is novel since it generates real-
istic noise rather than random noise or random padding. The noise generated is
learned from the network traffic generated by the user’s webbrowser. The informa-
tion recorded is the network traffic trace without the payload contents: each incoming
and outgoing packet’s size, and the time interval between packets and “train” of pack-
ets. A train is a set of incoming packets with size of MTU (Maximum Transmission
Unit) with the last packet size less than MTU. Usually an outgoing web request is
following by one or more trains of incoming packets. Replaying this recorded network
traffic will simulate that user’s browsing habit. Our hypothesis is that if the cover
traffic generated is similar to what the user usually does, this will provide a better
noise in preventing website fingerprinting and also reduce the bandwidth overhead
since this would be traffic that the user usually generates anyway. It has already been
shown that if a client visits several webpages at the same time [45], then it is hard
for an adversary to identify the webpage visited.
Instead of replaying the web requests to the actual servers which would use up
resources on these servers, we set up our own simple webserver. Our algorithm can
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Figure 3.1: Sample of recorded network traffic. The format is <timestamp>:<packet
size>. Red indicates outgoing packets.
be implemented as a plugin for Firefox (Tor Browser Bundle). It will send a web
request padded to a certain packet size to our webserver through the Tor network.
The request will contain the total size of data that the server has to send back and the
time that the data should be sent. Both the client plugin and webserver do not have
to send any content; only pad the packets to the specified packet size. The generated
network traffic will be transferred over the Tor network; a local adversary will not be
able to determine which packet is noise.
The algorithm will first record traffic of a web page, then parses the recorded traffic
trace. Packets are put into two sets based on whether they are incoming packets or
outgoing packets. For each set, packets are organized by trains of packets. For each
train, the size and timestamp of each packet is recorded. Trains of packets are listed
in order by the timestamp of the first packet in the train.
Figure 3.1 shows an example sample of a recorded network traffic. The only
information recorded is the relative time between packets and the packet sizes. Both
incoming and outgoing packets are recorded. The format of the sample shown in the
figure is as follows: <timestamp>:<packet size>. The actual time is not relevant;
only the time difference between two packets is used. This is the time difference
between the current packet’s timestamp and the next packet’s timestamp. The packet
size is the TCP-level packet size. A red packet size indicates an outgoing packet.
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Taking the packet traces from Figure 3.1 as the example, the following two ta-
bles are built. Table 3.2 shows the parsed outgoing packets set, denoted as TS out.
Table 3.3 shows the parsed incoming packets set, denoted as TS in. Most webbrows-
ing network traces have a higher number of incoming packets than outgoing packets.
Moreover, the size of the incoming packets is higher than outgoing packets, which are
usually web requests for a URL resource (such as jpg, html, etc...). This is typical
of web traffic and is reflected in the tables. Generating noisy cover traffic works as
follows.
I. Randomly select one traffic train from TSout and TSin each, denoted as Tout
and Tin respectively. The total size of Tout is Sout and the total size of Tin is
Sin.
II. Construct a cover traffic request with size Sout.
III. Send this request to the noise server.
IV. The server will reply back with data of size Sin in WTin milliseconds. WTin is
the time difference between the first packet of Tin and the first packet of the
next traffic train after Tin in the incoming traffic train set.
V. Wait for some time WTout, where WTout is the time difference between the first
packet of the chosen outgoing traffic train Tout and the first packet of the next
outgoing traffic train.
VI. Repeat steps 1 to 5 until the total incoming traffic from the noise server is equal
to the size of all the incoming packets of the recorded traffic trace.
As an example, let’s suppose outgoing traffic train 3 is selected from TSout and
incoming traffic train 8 is selected from TSin. Our algorithm will create a new cover
traffic request to send to the noise server. The request will ask the server to send back
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Table 3.2: The parsed outgoing traffic train set.
Traffic Train ID Time and Packets
1 516:565




5 5017:565 5018:1448 5018:1448 5019:1448 5020:1448 5022:1448
5022:1448 5024:1448 5024:1448
6 5042:1448 5044:651
7 5073:1448 5073:1448 5074:1448 5075:1448 5075:1448 5079:1448
5079:1448 5098:422
8 5130:1448 5130:1448 5133:1448 5155:476
9 5367:565
10 5388:1448 5388:1448 5391:1448 5395:988
11 5479:565
12 5505:1130
Table 3.3: The parsed incoming traffic train set.
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data of size 1448 + 1448 + 1448 + 476 = 4820 bytes with a time of 5367− 5130 = 237
milliseconds. The request contains only total size of data to be sent and the time.
For example, the server only needs to send padded data with size 4820. The lower
level network interface will determine how to send each packet – if the MTU is 1448,
packet size will be 1448 + 1448 + 1448 + 476. The outgoing packet will be of size
565 bytes. Since the actual contents of the packet is small, the rest of the packet is
padded. To simplify the example, we ignore packet headers. When the noise server
receive this cover traffic request, it will send back data of size 4820 bytes and sleep
for 237 milliseconds before responding to next request. At the same time, the client
side waits for 55 milliseconds, which is the time difference between the first packets of
the outgoing traffic train 4 and outgoing traffic train 5 from Table 3.2. This process
is repeated until the sum of all the incoming packet sizes from the server is equal to
the recorded traffic trace. The reason for waiting on both client and server sides is
to ensure that the generated noise traffic is well distributed to look more realistic.
This generated cover traffic can achieve better performance in terms of obfuscating
the overall traffic collected by a website fingerprinting attacker.
The user can choose as a parameter, the size of the cover traffic s. Since the
cover traffic mimicks the websites that the user has previously visited, the bandwidth
used will be doubled. To minimize the bandwidth overhead, each train size could be
reduced by a factor of s. The incoming train will thus have a total packet size of
0.5 × Sin in time WTin. This reduces the bandwidth overhead and generates fewer
packets.
We emphasize that the cover traffic is only between the client’s webbrowser and
the cover traffic webserver through Tor. The only data sent are padded data so that
the packets are of a certain pre-determined size. The cover traffic generated will look
realistic as it is traffic that was generated by the user. This recorded network traffic
is only stored locally on the browser.
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We expect our algorithm to effectively mitigate website fingerprinting attack since
it has already been shown that cover traffic is effective. We expect that our algorithm
will have lower bandwidth overhead since the amount of noise generated can be mod-
ified. Moreover, there is no extra latency added as no padding or network delay is
introduced. Our algorithm only generates cover traffic to another website.
3.4 Experimental Setup
We utilized the dataset provided by [2], which consists of 1, 125 webpages and 40
instances of each webpage. Each instance contains the timestamp of each packet
along with the packet sizes (negative packet sizes indicate outgoing packet). We
implemented the noise generation algorithm described in Section 3.3.
Due to the new data generated by our noise generation algorithm, we could not
re-use the authors [2] SVM algorithm. Instead we use the standard Weka [48] tool
and experimented with different classification algorithms: Support Vector Machine
(SVM), decision tree (REPTree in Weka), neural network (Multi-layer perceptron),
linear regression, and random forest.
The six classification features used in our experiments are similar to thoseused
in [2]. The first four features are: total size of outgoing packets, total size of incoming
packets, total number of outgoing packets, and total number of incoming packets.
The remaining two features are the sampled cumulative representation of packet size.
There are two ways to calculate the cumulative packet size: c is the cumulative size
of packets size where an outgoing packet has a negative packet size and a is the
cumulative size of packets size where both outgoing and incoming packet sizes are
denoted as positive numbers. The number of samples used n can be varied and will
be taken at equidistant points in the packet trace. For example, if there are 75 packets
and n = 100, a sample is taken every 0.75 packet. To determine the packet size of
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the 0.75th packet, the linear interpolation is calculated. If the 0th packet size was 10
and the 1st packet size was 20, the 0.75th packet size is (0.75∗ (20−10)) + 10 = 17.5.
We compared our proposed cover traffic algorithm with the basic cover traffic
scheme. The latter works as follows. When a user visits a website, the basic scheme
will randomly pick another website to also visit. As shown by [45], having two simul-
taneous website visits significantly lowers website fingerprinting accuracy.
The original dataset contained 1, 125 webpages, many from the same website. We
filtered out webpages of the same website and used 91 websites as our base training
dataset 1. The dataset [2] contained timestamps and packet sizes. Merging the
original website packet trace with the noise packet trace is relative straightforward.
Since there are 40 instances of each website, we randomly picked one instance as the
noise data to merge with the original packet trace.
We considered two different basic cover traffic algorithms. The first one always
picks the same webpage (but possibly different instances). The second one randomly
picks from a set of 10 webpages different from the 91 previously selected. The second
case provides a more diverse set of webpages and noise to be added.
Our noise generation algorithm “learning” dataset consists of a further 10 web-
pages where the packet traces are recorded. For each of the original 91 webpages, we
ran our algorithm to generate one packet trace of noise and merge that trace with
the original webpage packet trace.
3.5 Evaluation
Table 3.4 shows the accuracy of different classification algorithms including either only
feature c or both features a and c. The first four features are always included. As
1Note that since each webpage is a unique website, we used webpage and website interchangeably
from now on.
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Table 3.4: Accuracy of five statistical and machine learning algorithms considering
the two sets of attributes a and c mentioned in [2]. The sample size n used is 100.
shown in the table, adding feature a, the cumulative total of the absolute value of all
packet sizes, does not improve the accuracy of website fingerprinting attacks by much.
Unlike previous work, the SVM algorithm had a very low accuracy. The reason for
this is due to the parameters used for the machine learning algorith. When changing
some parameters, SVM achieved an accuracy of 68%. We plan on exploring SVM
further. The table shows that Random Forest, which is a collection of decision trees,
performs the best at 82% accuracy. The sample size n was set to the recommended
100 from [2]. We considered only the Random Forest classification algorithm in the
rest of this research.
We varied the sample size n from 10 to 200. Figure 3.2 shows the accuracy when
considering including either only feature c or both features (a and c). As observed,
the accuracy is stable at 82% when the sample size is greater than 50. Thus we pick
sample size n = 100 and without feature a in future experiments.
Figure 3.3 shows the classification accuracy for varying amount of noise added to
original traces. Figure 3.4 shows the bandwidth overhead in % of the extra netwok
traffic generated. The two basic cover traffic algorithms are indicated by k = 1 for
adding the same one website as noise each time and by k = 10 for randomly adding
one of ten websites as noise. The x-axis indicates the amount of noise s added. When
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Figure 3.2: The accuracy using the Random Forest algorithm when varying the sample
size. Note the y-axis does not start at 0.
s = 1.0, this means the whole packet trace is added as noise. When s = 0.5, only
half of the packet trace is added as noise, that is, every other packet is added as
noise to preserve the time intervals. For the basic cover traffic cases (k = 1 and
k = 10), we are “simulating” the noise generated; in a real-world setting, this would
be hard to achieve without controlling the server – in this case, the browser could
send random packets. We show different values of s to compare with our algorithm.
As more noise is added (s increases), the accuracy decreases, as expected. Similarly,
the bandwidth overhead also increases as more noise is added. Our proposed noise
generation algorithm achieves the same accuracy regardless of the amount of noise;
this is because we are generating realistic noise that can more effectively hide a user’s
real traffic rather than generating random noise. Our algorithm’s bandwidth overhead
is the same as the basic cases. However, even with s = 0.25, the overhead is 20% and
the accuracy is 14%. Since our proposed algorithm generates random packet traces
based on real recorded network traffic, we ran our experiments five times; the graphs
show the average of the five experiments. For these experiments, the training dataset
used in the Random Forest classification algorithm is the original 91 webpages and
the testing dataset is the new webpages with noise added.
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Figure 3.3: The accuracy using the Random Forest algorithm when introducing dif-
ferent kinds of cover traffic.
Figure 3.4: The bandwidth overhead when introducing different kinds of cover traffic.
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Intuitively, accuracy should decrease as more noise is added. However, in Fig-
ure 3.3, we found that in our algorithm, s = 0.25 has a lower accuracy than s = 0.5.
We hypothesized that this could be due to the features being considered. Recall that
two of the five features are the total number of incoming packets and the total size
of incoming packets. When s is lower, the number of incoming packets is lower. To
verify our hypothesis, we re-ran our algorithms without considering these two fea-
tures of incoming packets. Figure 3.5 shows the result. It can be seen that without
these two features, accuracy decreases as noise generated increases, which is expected.
This shows that the attributes for total size of incoming packets and total number of
incoming packets help the website fingerprinting adversary in successfully identifying
the correct website (increase in accuracy). Without these two features, our proposed
algorithm performs even better as the accuracy is reduced to under 10% when s = 1.0.
Previous work [45] has shown that the number of incoming packets is one of the most
useful attributes in classification for website fingerprinting. We also considered not
including the incoming packet features; the results are shown in Figure 3.6. The re-
sults are expected as well but the change in accuracy is not as obvious as Figure 3.5
since the number of outgoing packets is about the same regardless of the value of s.
Figure 3.5: The accuracy using the Random Forest algorithm when considering the
incoming packet features or not.
Table comparing our results vs others (CS-BUFLO, Tamaraw, WTF-PAD, etc...)
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Figure 3.6: The accuracy using the Random Forest algorithm when considering the
outgoing packet features or not.
3.6 Related Work
It has been shown that analyzing encrypted network traffic can reveal the websites
and webpages visited [2, 31–35, 37–47, 49]. Since the payload is encrypted, only the
metadata is available such as packet sizes, number of packets, direction of packets,
and time interval between packets. A training dataset is built. Then, given a network
traffic trace, machine learning techniques are used to predict the website visited. Pre-
vious results have shown that websites can be recognized with a high accuracy. More
recent research results have looked at anonymized network traces such as using Tor
instead of a simple HTTPS proxy. Although initial results showed that Tor provided
adequate protection against website fingerprinting, more advanced data parsing tech-
niques show that websites can be recognized with a fairly high accuracy even when
the website trace is over Tor. The consequences of website fingerprinting is censorship
or prosecution by the government if the user visits a forbidden website. It has been
argued [50] that website fingerprinting is not a practical attack due to the large num-
ber of webpages and the false positive would be high. Website fingerprinting attacks
have also been extended to identify the webbrowser used [4], which could lead to user
identification and linking as most users utilize a unique webbrowser (based on fonts
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installed, languages, plugins, etc...) [51,52].
Website fingerprinting is one type of network traffic analysis. There has been other
work on network traffic analysis [53] and traffic analysis resistant protocols [24,54,55].
Network traffic analysis is usually performed for censorship [56]. Various techniques
to avoid censorship have been proposed, using traffic morphing [57] to disguise the
network traffic as VoIP [58,59] or using other covert channels [60–62]. It has, however,
been shown that it is still possible to see through this obfuscation [63–65].
Using cover/dummy/fake traffic to mask a user’s activities has been proposed be-
fore [66]. It has been shown that this mechanism can be countered or the cover traffic
removed [67,68] to reveal the user’s activities. Cover traffic is useful to mask real web
search queries by performing many other unrelated and random search queries. Cover
traffic can also be used to make network traffic analysis harder by adding unrelated
network-level packets. Our algorithm generates realistic cover traffic making it harder
for website fingerprinting attacks to accurately guess the website from the observed
packet trace. Another scheme, Track Me Not [69], focused on web search queries and
generating fake web searches, but [70] has shown that web search queries obfuscation
can still be analyzed.
Various website fingerprinting defenses have been proposed [1, 32–36, 42]. They
all make use of some sort of padding, delaying sending of packets, or adding cover
traffic. Many of these defenses have high latency and/or bandwidth overhead and
have been shown to be somewhat effective in mitigating website fingerprinting attacks.
Our proposed cover traffic defense has zero latency overhead and lower bandwidth
overhead while maintaining a high level of effectiveness.
Traffic morphing [57] is another possible defense against website fingerprinting
attacks. It attempts to modify the shape and patterns of network traffic such that
it looks different. For example, Stegotorus [71] attemps to make Tor network traffic
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look like HTTPS. Similarly, [58, 59] attempt to morph Tor traffic to look like VoIP
traffic so that network traffic analysis or deep packet inspection will not allow Tor
traffic to be blocked or identified; VoIP traffic is usually allowed. However, [64, 65]
have shown that these traffic morphing schemes can be circumvented. We are not
proposing to modify network traffic patterns. Our algorithm generates realistic cover
traffic to mask the original packet trace.
3.7 Conclusion
We showed that our proposed cover traffic (noise generation) algorithm mitigates
website fingerprinting attacks as effectively as current existing schemes. However,
the bandwidth overhead is only 20%, much lower than existing schemes. The latency
overhead is also 0%.
We plan to expand this work in considering more webpages for both the training
dataset and our learning algorithm. A more detailed study on the different classi-
fication algorithms and parameters used will also be performed. For this research,
we used an existing dataset; we plan on implementing the webbrowser plug-in and
deploy on the Tor browser bundle. Since our algorithm records the packet traces of
the user, even though the storage is local only for packet size and timestamp, with no
identifiable information such as IP address, it has to be determined if the algorithm
could leak any information by generating the cover traffic. Further improvements to
our algorithm can be made, such as, if a user has multiple tabs open at the same





Webbrowser fingerprinting is widely used in nowadays Internet environment. Many
Web services employ webbrowser fingerprinting techniques to track end users. The
identification of an end user can import great benefits to web services providers.
For example, an advertisement service provider can export new car ad to a user
if the user once access auto-vender websites and his/her browser’s fingerprinting is
recorded by the website. Among these webbrowser fingerprinting techniques, browser
plugins, cookies and Javascripts codes are used to collect fingerprinting charactics.
These tools can collect webbrowser specific information such as webbrowser’ producer,
minor version, plug-in usages and font usages etc. Combining these information, an
end user can be accurately identified.
The goal of this research is to determine whether the webbrowser fingerprinting
characteristics can be obtained based solely on network traffic. The adversary is not
the server, but any entity between the client and the server. The adversary thus
can only eavesdrop on the network traffic. Relying only on the network traffic, the
goal is then to identify the webbrowser being used. The effects of identifying the
webbrowser are tracking users across different sessions and multiple connections to
different servers, or injecting malware specific to a webbrowser. As shown in [51,52],
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users can be almost uniquely identified from their webbrowser information.
All the work on webbrowser identification such as [51, 72] have assumed that the
identifier entity is located at the server’s side. That entity has the ability to set
cookies, look at user agent strings, and so on. Using this method, a lot of information
can be collected about the webbrowser such as the type of browser (Firefox, Internet
Explorer), the major and minor version of the software, the fonts installed, plugins
installed/enabled, and the web history of that user. All this information can be used
to uniquely identify and track users across different sessions over time and across
different website visits.
For network traffic identification, the closest work is website fingerprinting [43,44].
Looking at anonymized and encrypted network traffic, an adversary can identify the
website being visited. This is useful for censoring particular websites. Our work
focuses on network traffic analysis and uses similar techniques to identify webbrowsers.
Threat Model: The threat model considered in this research is that the client
machine, the webbrowser used, and the server are all honest and free of any malware
or bugs. The adversary can see the traffic between the client and the server. The
adversary could be the client’s ISP or any router on the path from the client to
the server. The network traffic could be encrypted or in plain-text or through an
anonymizing network such as Tor [13]. The adversary can only eavesdrop on the
network traffic; it cannot modify, drop, or inject any network packet.
Previous works [32, 41] have proved that websites can be accurately identified
by checking traffic data transfered between webbrowser and web server. In their
paper, one important assumption is that the attacker knows victim’s browser and
its configuration. In this research, our research shows that when accessing a specific
website, the traffic data between webbrowser and web server is seriously affected by
the webbrowser specific characteristics. These webbrowser specific characteristics, like
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browser type and plug-in usages, can be accurately identified based on traffic data.
For the websites used in our experiments, the identification accuracy rate ranges from
72% to 85%. Popular webbrowser plug-ins like JavaScript and flash usage status can
be also be accurately identified.
The research is organized as follows. Section 4.2 provides an overview of previous
work on webbrowser and website fingerprinting and identification. Our experimental
setup is described in more details in Section 4.3 and the results shown in Section 4.4.
Finally, a discussion of what the results imply for the future of webbrowsers is given
in Section 4.5.
4.2 Related Work
It has been shown [31,32,41–44] that analyzing network traffic can reveal the websites
and webpages being visited. The authors looked mostly at packet sizes and packet
direction. They collected a training dataset from specific websites and clustered the
dataset. Given a network traffic trace, the authors used machine learning techniques
to predict the website visited. Website fingerprinting can be used when users want to
hide who they are communicating with, for example, by using Tor [13]. These users
might want to bypass any censorship mechanism blocking certain websites. Using
website fingerprinting, the censor can identify users accessing censored web content.
The latest paper [44] showed that specific websites can be accurately identified, only
by examining the network trace. Our work differs in that although we are analyzing
network traffic, the traffic analysis is used to identify and track webbrowsers, not to
fingerprint websites visited.
Panopticlick [51, 52] showed how browser information, such as user agent string,
fonts installed, languages supported, and plugins enabled, can be used to uniquely
identify users. Every user has an almost unique fingerprint and this can be used to
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track users visiting different websites or across different visits to the same website.
The main goal of identifying users is to track them. This is especially useful for
advertising. The EverCookie [73] is a persistent storage that is not cleared when
the browsers cleans its cache and cookies. This permanent cookie can be used to
track users. [72] showed how users can still be tracked without setting any cookies.
FPDetective [74] did a wide survey of popular Internet websites and determined which
website was performining browser fingerprinting. Our work is different because the
fingerprinting is not at the server side; we assume the server is honest. Instead, the
adversary can only eavesdrop on network traffic between the client and the server.
In an attempt to hide their Internet activities, remain anonymous, or bypass
censors, anonymity-providing schemes such as Tor [13,14] and Anonymizer [75] have
been deployed. These schemes only hide who is communicating with whom. Network
traffic analysis can still be performed to identify any website visited. Server-side
fingerprinting can still be performed to identify users and webbrowsers. There are
tools [76, 77] that attempt to remove identifying or sensitive information from web
headers. However, they don’t provide complete protection as shown in [44,72].
Network traffic analysis have been around for some time [20, 55]. They can be
used to detect the application being used (such as Skype), or more commonly, to
deanonymize users. Various countermeasures such as traffic morphing [57] have been
proposed. A survey of network traffic analysis attacks and countermeasures is given
in [54]. In our work, we leverage network traffic analysis to identify and track users
from their webbrowser information.
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Software Version
Client Operating System Windows 7
Web Browser 1 Google Chrome 29.0
Web Browser 2 Mozilla Firefox 24.0
Web Browser 3 Internet Explorer 10.0
Web Browser 4 Tor Browser Bundle 3.6.1
Network Protocol Analyzer Wireshark 1.10.1
Data Mining Tool Weka 3.6.10
Table 4.1: Software used during experiments and classification.
4.3 Experimental Setup
4.3.1 Collecting Data
Our assumption is that we know which web site the user is visiting, and we need to
identify who is visiting the web site, that is, to get the fingerprinting information of
the webbrowser which the user is using. The information we can use to reach this
goal is only the network traffic generated when browsing a web page. In this research,
network traffic data are collected for four types of webbrowsers and homepages of 9
top Alexa [78] websites. Our experiments are done on Windows 7 platform. The
browsers we run experiments upon are Google Chrome, Internet Explorer, Firefox
and Tor Browser Bundle. The first three are widely used web browsers. Tor Browser
Bundle [76] is a pre-configured Firefox browser, it integrates Tor software to the
webbrowser and takes advantage of Tor to protect users’ anonymity. Wireshark is
used to record TCP/IP traffic data. Table 4.1 shows the detail of softwares we used.












Table 4.2: Websites used for experiments.
open them in web browsers and record TCP/IP traffic data. Some web sites sup-
port localization, they will automatically switch to different versions of web pages
according to the region where we launch the browser. When using Tor Browser
bundle, the region of our browser is determined by the exit node of the Tor cir-
cuit. In our experiments, we specify the region for google.com and yahoo.com as
https://www.google.com/ncr and https://us.yahoo.com/?p=us respectively. In
this way, we can ensure that each time we are visiting the same website. Table 4.2
lists the detail of web sites we used.
To run experiments automatically, we wrote a Java program. This program will
iterate all these 9 websites and 4 browsers. For each iteration, the following 5 steps
are taken:
I. Launch Wireshark to record traffic data.
II. Wait 30 seconds then launch one web browser and connect to a website.
III. Wait 300 seconds then kill web browser.
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Browser plugin status
flash enable enable disable disable
JavaScript disable enable enable disable
Table 4.3: plugin usage status of browser.
IV. Save traffic data to file and wait 30 seconds then Quit Wireshark.
V. Wait 300 seconds then go to step 1 and start another experiment.
For each experiment, we open a website with a specific web browser and then
record all the TCP/IP packets between the web browser and the web server. In step
1, we launch Wireshark first. In step 2, we wait 30 seconds. The 30 seconds delay is
to ensure we dont miss any packets. in step 3, we keep the browser running for 600
seconds so that all the contents of the web page have been downloaded. In step 4, the
traffic data is recorded to a file like windows chrome exp1 amazon 20130915. We use
file name to record information like OS platform, browser type, web site name and
experiment number. To avoid experiments influencing each other, for example, web
clients receive packets comes from web servers we visited in the previous experiment,
in step 5, we wait another 300 seconds.
Javascript and flash are two popular plug-ins. With JavaScript, web pages are
more user friendly. With flash, we can watch videos on web pages. However,
JavaScript and flash can also put users at risk. To avoid this, some users tend to
disable them. Taking the plug-ins usage into consideration, we define a browser to be
in four different status, Table 4.3 shows the detail of these four status.
Except for Tor Browser Bundle [76], we perform 10 experiments for each browser,
web page and plugin usages status combination. In total we have 1440 experiments




To analysis these traffic data, for each experiment, we transfer the packets information
to a data series based on the direction of packets (outgoing and incoming) and time
series they are recorded. We sum up the packet size for a specific time frame interval
based on the direction of packets. For outgoing packets, we use negative numbers to
represent them by multiplying the sum of packets size with −1. We put the browser
type at the end of the data series as class attribute. For each web site, we have 160
(10 × 4 × 4) experiments. Correspondingly we have 160 data series.
Weka [48] is a popular open source data mining tool, it provides lots of powerful
classification algorithms. In this research, Weka [48] is used as the classification tool.
To use Weka [48], we put all the 160 data series to a file with .arff file format (the
standard Weka dataset file format). To get the best classification model, we tried Ze-
roR, OneR, C4.5, NaiveBayes and SVM (support vector machine) algorithms. These
algorithms are all implemented in Weka [48]. ZeroR is the base line of classification,
basically, it is randomly guessing based on probability. oneR is trying to find one
attribute to classify instances. The test model we used is 10-fold cross-validation.
In this test model, the dataset is randomly reordered and then split into 10 folds of
equal size. In each iteration, one fold is used for testing and the other 9 folds are
used for training the classifier. The test results are collected and averaged over all
folds. Cross validation is quite useful in dealing with small datasets since it utilizes
the greatest amount of training data from the dataset [79].
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Figure 4.1: Average identification accuracy for different type of browsers when analysis
time frame is 2 seconds.
4.4 Results
4.4.1 Webbrowser type identification
The type of the webbrowser is one of the most common webbrowser fingerprinting
characteristics. Webbrowser type and version information usually can be obtained by
checking the http user-agent header. Our assumption is that we can not see the plain-
text of the packets content. All we have is the time series of packet size. Classification
models are built upon these time series and the type of classification algorithm.
Figure 4.1 shows the average accuracy rate of identifying browser type for all
nine web sites with C4.5 classification algorithm. In this research, we use accuracy
rate to represent the performance of a classification model. Suppose 40 experiments
with 10 experiments for each one of the four type of browsers, 8 experiments are
correctly classified as using Chrome, 7 experiments are correctly classified as using
Firefox, then the accuracy rate of identifying Chrome and Firefox is 80% and 70%
correspondingly.
The accuracy rate of identifying browser type is slightly different for specific
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browsers. We can see that the best one is for Google Chrome which is identified
with 87.27% average accuracy rate. That means that for all 360 experiments which
use Chrome, 317 (360 × 0.88) of them are correctly identified, and 43 of them are
identified as others. Tor browser bundle has lowest identification average accuracy
which is around 69.99%. In our dataset, we have 4 different types of browsers, so
the base line probability of identifying the correct browser type is 25%. Our worst
accuracy rate, which is 70% for Tor bundler, is still 2.8 times of the base line accuracy.
For different websites, the accuracy rate of identifying browser type also changes.
Table 4.4 shows the exact accuracy rate for nine websites. Though the accuracy
rate changes for different websites, we can see that for each specific website, when
browsing with different browsers, their traffic data series have significant difference.
Among these 9 websites, www.facebook.com has the best average accuracy which is
about 85% and www.qq.com has the worst average accuracy which is about 73%.
Though 70% accuracy rate is pretty good comparing to the 25% base line accuracy,
there are still some improvements we can make to enhance it. Like Cai’s work [32],
we can round packets size to a multiple of 600 and remove noises of traffic data. In
future works, we will try these kinds of data refine to get higher accuracy.
4.4.2 Webbrowser plug-ins identification
Besides the browser type, plug-in usage status is also important characteristic to fin-
gerprint a browser. In this research, our assumption is that we have 13 combinations
of browser type and plug-in usages. For browser Chrome, IE and Firefox, each of
them can have 4 possible plug-in usage combination regarding the enabling or dis-
abling of flash and JavaScript plug-in. For Tor bundle, we use the default plug-in
setting.
We run C4.5 classification algorithm against the packet size series, the test model
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Identification accuracy (%)




www.amazon.com 89.74 82.05 64.10 75.68 77.89
www.ebay.com 84.62 87.18 82.05 70.15 81.00
www.facebook.com 92.50 80.00 87.50 81.08 85.27
www.google.com 95.00 70.00 77.50 64.86 76.84
www.live.com 84.62 82.05 89.74 63.64 80.01
www.qq.com 89.74 61.54 74.36 64.86 72.63
www.taobao.com 76.92 76.92 84.62 69.35 76.95
www.yahoo.com 85.00 72.50 75.00 70.27 75.69
www.youtube.com 90.00 67.50 85.00 73.30 78.95
Average 87.27 76.53 79.36 69.99 78.29
Table 4.4: Idenfification accuracy for specific website.
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Figure 4.2: Average identification accuracy for different combination of browser and plug-
ins when analysis time frame is 2 seconds. See table 4.5 for the detail of the combination.
we used is 10 fold cross verification, similar for identifying browser type. Figure 4.2
shows that for all 9 websites, the average identification accuracy of combinations of
browser type and plug-ins. Besides Tor bundle, which we use default plug-in setting,
the highest identification accuracy is for combination number 4 which is about 70.62%
and the lowest one is for combination number 11, which is about 31.11%. Since there
are 13 classes of browser type and plug-ins usage combination, the baseline probability
of identifying one combination is less then 7.7% ( 1/13 = 0.0769) . Our worst case of
accuracy, which is 31.11% is more then 4 times of the baseline probability. When the
time frame of the packets size is 2 seconds, the average accuracy of all 13 combination
is about 52.0%, which is 6.7 times higher than the baseline probability.
Table 4.5 shows the detail of combination of browser type and plug-in usage.
For a specific website, the average identification accuracy of all 13 combination
changes slightly. For websites like YouTube, eBay and Amazon, they have relatively
higher average identification accuracy. The reason is that their web pages contains
more videos/images, and they use JavaScript to control how these videos/images are
displayed on web pages. Enabling or disabling JavaScript and flash have much more
influence to the network traffic than other websites.
58
No. Browser type Flash plug-in JavaScript plug-in
1 Chrome disable enable
2 Chrome disable disable
3 Chrome enable enable
4 Chrome enable disable
5 Firefox disable enable
6 Firefox disable disable
7 Firefox enable enable
8 Firefox enable disable
9 IE disable enable
10 IE disable disable
11 IE enable enable
12 IE enable disable
13 Tor bundle N.A. N.A.
Table 4.5: Different combinations of browser type and plug-ins usage status.
Figure 4.3: Average identification accuracy of each website for different combination of
browser and plug-ins when analysis time frame is 2 seconds.
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Figure 4.4: Average identification accuracy of C4.5 algorithm for different type of browsers
and different time frames.
4.4.3 Varying time frames and classification algorithms
To get the best result, we tried time frames from 1 second to 10 seconds to generate
the different data series. The basic idea is that when time frame is smaller, the data
series we get contains finer information about the traffic. On the other hand, when
time frame is smaller, it will take more time to run the classifier and model is also
easier to suffer over-fitting. Besides the better accuracy rate of classification, we also
need some kind of trade-off between the accuracy rate and model complexity. Figure
4.4 shows that for algorithm C4.5, the time frames we take has slight influence to the
accuracy rate of identifying browser type.
When classifying a dataset, what kind of classification algorithm we choose usu-
ally have great influence to the performance of the final classification model. In this
research, to find the best classification model, we tried zeroR, oneR, C4.5, Naive-
Bayes and SVM algorithms. Table 4.6 shows the average browser type identification
accuracy rate of all four type of browsers and nine websites when using different
classification algorithms.
Among all these 5 algorithms, the C4.5 algorithm has best performance. It has
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seconds zeroR oneR C4.5 NaiveBayes SVM
1 24.29 67.51 80.81 72.47 24.50
2 24.29 68.52 80.56 65.74 24.78
3 24.29 67.53 81.89 63.25 24.29
4 24.29 66.34 81.09 62.92 24.29
5 24.29 65.97 79.94 61.15 24.29
6 24.29 66.59 80.65 62.97 24.29
7 24.29 66.57 79.29 62.70 24.29
8 24.29 66.61 80.90 62.39 24.29
9 24.29 66.79 80.24 63.32 24.29
10 24.29 66.79 80.41 60.28 24.29
Table 4.6: Identification accuracy for different time frame and classification algorithm.
around 80% accuracy and the accuracy is relatively stable for different time frames.
Accuracy of NaiveBayes algorithm seems to increase as time frames become smaller.
But as we take smaller time frames, say 0.5, its accuracy did not increase.
SVM works badly in our case, there are two reasons: 1, data series used in this
research are all based on raw data, we have no data rounding or normalization. 2,
to ensure all traffic data are recorded, for each experiment, we collect all traffic data
in 5 minutes starting from the launch of accessing a web page. This results that we
have lots of zeros and small random numbers in the data series because a web page
usually can be loaded in less then 1 minute. These zeros and small random numbers
in data series decrease the classification accuracy of SVM greatly.
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4.4.4 Summary
Our research has shown that we can identify the webbrowser type with a high accuracy
rate by solely checking the time series of network packets size. Popular plug-ins usage
status can also be identified with a good accuracy rate as well. The methodology used
in this research is straightforward and can be easily reused for different webbrowser
fingerprinting purpose.
4.5 Discussion and Conclusion
We have shown that it is possible to identify webbrowsers characteristics through
network traffic analysis only, even if the network traffic is encrypted and through an
anonymized service such as Tor. The consequences of this research are numerous.
The webbrowsers and plugins used can be identified through network traffic analysis
only. Users can potentially be identified and tracked across sessions and visits to
different websites. The identification entity does not have to be part of the server. It
can be any router along the path from the user to the server, for example, the ISP of
the server or the user.
Our research also shows that the traffic data is seriously affected by webbrowser
specific characteristics. This suggests that when we perform website fingerprinting
based on traffic data, the webbrowser plays an important role and need to be consid-
ered in future work.
There remains more work to be done in this research area. More experiments
need to be performed. The number of experiments per website need to be increased.
The number of websites tested need to be increased. The reason why the difference
of traffic data exists is also an interesting topic.
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CHAPTER 5
Conclusion and Future Work
In this dissertation, we use data analytics to learn from and improve existing sys-
tems. We focus on privacy-aware systems and three data analytics case studies are
conducted.
In the first case study, we showed that a circuit clogging attack is still possible
in the current Tor network. The costs to perform a circuit clogging attack are also
very low, making it a practical attack. We showed that the Tor relays used in a
circuit can be accurately identified. Moreover, the false positive rate is low as only
some other Tor relays not used in the circuit are accidentally identified as being
part of the circuit. A circuit clogging attack detection mechanism is also proposed.
The scheme uses a probe to monitor all the circuits created by the client. Once an
increase in network latency from a previously recorded baseline time is measured,
the server is flagged as suspicious. The client can then disconnect from the server
and destroy the affected circuit. Through experiments on the real Tor network, the
proposed detection scheme has an accuracy of over 85%. This research showed that
the anonymity of a person using Tor is reduced since the Tor relays used can be
identified. This can be a stepping stone towards narrowing down the possible users
behind these relays. The detection scheme proposed allows a user to detect possible
occurrences of circuit clogging attacks. With over 500, 000 users daily, the attack has
huge potential consequences. The proposed detection scheme can help hundreds of
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thousands of people stay anonymous on the Internet. The current attack identifies
the Tor relays in the circuit; future work will identify which of the relays are the entry,
middle, and exit relays. This would require more fine-grained probe measurements.
One of the anonymity improvements in Tor is to use entry guards, a fixed set of three
relays used as entry relay in any circuit. We will also analyze whether using entry
guards leaks any information, as the user could be more easily identified. If the same
entry relay is found in circuits, this can leak information about the user. The possible
impact of the attack on bridges and hidden servers is left as future work.
In the second case study, we showed that our proposed cover traffic (noise gen-
eration) algorithm mitigates website fingerprinting attacks as effectively as current
existing schemes. However, the bandwidth overhead is only 20%, much lower than
existing schemes. The latency overhead is also 0%. We plan to expand this work in
considering more webpages for both the training dataset and our learning algorithm.
A more detailed study on the different classification algorithms and parameters used
will also be performed. For this research, we used an existing dataset; we plan on im-
plementing the webbrowser plug-in and deploy on the Tor browser bundle. Since our
algorithm records the packet traces of the user, even though the storage is local only
for packet size and timestamp, with no identifiable information such as IP address, it
has to be determined if the algorithm could leak any information by generating the
cover traffic. Further improvements to our algorithm can be made, such as, if a user
has multiple tabs open at the same time, no noise is needed. This would reduce the
bandwidth overhead.
In the third case study, we have shown that it is possible to identify webbrowsers
characteristics through network traffic analysis only, even if the network traffic is
encrypted and through an anonymized service such as Tor. The consequences of this
research are numerous. The webbrowsers and plugins used can be identified through
network traffic analysis only. Users can potentially be identified and tracked across
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sessions and visits to different websites. The identification entity does not have to be
part of the server. It can be any router along the path from the user to the server, for
example, the ISP of the server or the user. Our research also shows that the traffic
data is seriously affected by webbrowser specific characteristics. This suggests that
when we perform website fingerprinting based on traffic data, the webbrowser plays
an important role and need to be considered in future work. There remains more
work to be done in this research area. More experiments need to be performed. The
number of experiments per website need to be increased. The number of websites
tested need to be increased. The reason why the difference of traffic data exists is
also an interesting topic.
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[10] U. Möller, L. Cottrell, P. Palfrader, and L. Sassaman, “Mixmaster Protocol —
Version 2.” IETF Internet Draft, July 2003.
[11] M. Rennhard and B. Plattner, “Introducing MorphMix: Peer-to-Peer based
Anonymous Internet Usage with Collusion Detection,” in Proceedings of the
Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society (WPES 2002), (Washington, DC,
USA), November 2002.
[12] M. Rennhard and B. Plattner, “Practical anonymity for the masses with mor-
phmix,” in Proceedings of Financial Cryptography (FC ’04) (A. Juels, ed.),
pp. 233–250, Springer-Verlag, LNCS 3110, February 2004.
[13] “Tor.” https://www.torproject.org/.
[14] R. Dingledine, N. Mathewson, and P. Syverson, “Tor: The second-generation
onion router,” in Proceedings of the 13th USENIX Security Symposium, August
2004.
[15] “Tor metrics portal.” https://metrics.torproject.org/.
[16] N. Hopper, E. Y. Vasserman, and E. Chan-Tin, “How much anonymity does
network latency leak?,” in Proceedings of the 14th ACM conference on Computer
and communications security (CCS), pp. 82–91, 2007.
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neel, “Fpdetective: Dusting the web for fingerprinters,” in Proceedings of the
2013 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer &#38; Communications Security,
CCS ’13, (New York, NY, USA), pp. 1129–1140, ACM, 2013.
[75] “Anonymizer.” https://www.anonymizer.com/.












Candidate for the Degree of 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
Thesis:    APPLICATION OF DATA ANALYTICS — CASE STUDIES 
 
 






Completed the requirements for the Doctor of Philosophy in Computer Science 
at Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, Oklahoma in May, 2017. 
 
Completed the requirements for the Master of Science in Computer Science at 
Wuhan University of Technology, Wuhan, China in 2006. 
  
Completed the requirements for the Bachelor of Science in Material Science and 
Engineering at Wuhan University of Technology, Wuhan, China in 2004. 
 
Experience:  I graduated from Wuhan University of Technology in 2006. After 
that, I worked as a software engineer in Shanghai China for about 6 
years. In 2012, I joined the Ph.D. program at Oklahoma State 
University. 
 
Professional Memberships:   
 
 
 
 
 
 
